2005-营销弊端病因和治疗

引用

Christensen C M , Cook S , Hall T .Marketing malpractice: the cause and the cure[J].Harvard business review, 2006, 83(12):74-83, 152.

Christensen, C. M. ,  Cook, S. , &  Hall, T. . (2006). Marketing malpractice: the cause and the cure. Harvard business review, 83(12), 74-83, 152.

 

简单的想法

Thirty thousand new consumer products hit store shelves each year. Ninety percent of them fail. Why? We’re using misguided market-segmentation practices. For in- stance, we slice markets based on customer type and define the needs of representative customers in those segments. But actual human beings don’t behave like statistically average customers. The consequences? We develop new and enhanced products that don’t meet real people’s needs.

每年有三万种新的消费品上架。他们中的百分之九十都失败了。为什么呢？我们正在使用被误导的市场细分实践。例如，我们根据客户类型对市场进行细分，并定义这些细分市场中代表性客户的需求。但是真实的人类并不像统计上的普通顾客那样表现。后果呢？我们开发新的和增强的产品，不满足人们真实的需求。

Here’s a better way: Instead of trying to understand the “typical” customer, find out what jobs people want to get done. Then develop purpose brands: products or services consumers can “hire” to perform those jobs. FedEx, for example, designed its service to perform the “I-need-to-send-this- from-here-to-there-with-perfect-certainty- as-fast-as-possible” job. FedEx was so much more convenient, reliable, and reasonably priced than the alternatives—the U.S. Postal Service or couriers paid to sit on air- lines—that businesspeople around the globe started using “FedEx” as a verb.

这里有一个更好的方法：不要试图理解“典型的”客户，而是找出人们想要完成的工作。然后开发目的品牌：消费者可以被“雇佣”来完成个人思考产品或服务的工作。例如，联邦快递（FedEx）将其服务设计为执行“我需要以最快的速度将其从这里发送到那里”的任务。联邦快递比其他选择——美国邮政服务或付费乘坐航空公司的快递员——方便、可靠、价格合理，以至于全球各地的商人开始使用“联邦快递”作为动词。

A clear purpose brand acts as a two-sided compass: One side guides customers to the right products. The other guides your de- signers, marketers, and advertisers as they develop and market new and improved products. The payoff? Products your cus- tomers consistently value—and brands that deliver sustained profitable growth to your company.

一个目标明确的品牌就像一个双面指南针：一面引导顾客找到正确的产品。另一个指导你的设计师、营销人员和广告商开发和营销新的和改进的产品。回报？您的客户一贯重视的产品，以及为您的公司带来持续盈利增长的品牌。

个人思考：现在新产品研发失败主要是因为没有正确获取消费者的需求。为解决上述问题，本文提出可以雇佣目标顾客，获取消费者真实需求，以此获取利润增长点。

Observe Consumers in Action 观察消费者的行动

By observing and interviewing people as they’re using products, identify jobs they want to get done. Then think of new or enhanced offerings that could do the job better.

通过观察和采访人们使用产品，确定他们想要完成的工作。然后想出可以更好地完成工作的新的或增强的产品。

Example:  示例：

A fast-food restaurant wanted to improve milk-shake sales. A researcher watched cus- tomers buying shakes, noting that 40% of shakes were purchased by hurried customers early in the morning and carried out to cus- tomers’ cars. Interviews revealed that most customers bought shakes to do a similar job: make their commute more interesting, stave off hunger until lunchtime, and give them something they could consume cleanly with one hand. Understanding this job inspired several product-improvement ideas. One ex- ample: Move the shake-dispensing machine to the front of the counter and sell customers a prepaid swipe card, so they could dispense shakes themselves and avoid the slow drive- through lane.

一家快餐店想提高奶昔的销量。一位研究人员观察了顾客购买奶昔的情况，指出40%的奶昔是由匆忙的顾客在清晨购买并送到顾客的汽车上的。采访显示，大多数顾客购买奶昔是为了做类似的工作：让他们的通勤更有趣，避免饥饿直到午餐时间，给他们一些可以用一只手干净地消费的东西。了解这项工作激发了几个产品改进的想法。一个例子是：把奶昔分发机移到柜台前面，卖给顾客一张预付费刷卡，这样他们就可以自己分发奶昔，避开缓慢的免下车通道。

Link Products to Jobs through Advertising 

Use advertising to clarify the nature of the job your product performs and to give the prod- uct a name that reinforces awareness of its purpose. Savvy ads can even help consumers identify needs they weren’t consciously aware of before.

通过广告将产品与工作联系起来使用广告来阐明你的产品所执行的工作的性质，并给产品起一个名字来加强对其目的的认识。精明的广告甚至可以帮助消费者识别他们以前没有意识到的需求。

Example:  示例：

Unilever’s Asian operations designed a microwavable soup tailored to the job of helping office workers boost their energy and productivity in the late afternoon. Called Soupy Snax, the product generated mediocre results. When Unilever renamed it Soupy Snax—4:00 and created ads showing lethargic workers perking up after using the product, ad viewers remarked, “That’s what happens to me at 4:00!” Soupy Snax sales soared.

联合利华的亚洲业务设计了一种微型汤，旨在帮助办公室工作人员在下午晚些时候提高他们的精力和生产力。该产品名为Soupy Snax，产生了中等结果。当联合利华将其改名为Soupy Snax-4:00，并制作广告展示昏昏欲睡的工人在使用该产品后振作起来时，广告观众评论道：“这就是我在4:00发生的事情！”Soupy Snax销量飙升。

Extend Your Purpose Brand  扩展您的目的品牌

If you extend your purpose brand onto prod- ucts that do different jobs—for example, a toothpaste that freshens breath and whitens teeth and reduces plaque—customers may become confused and lose trust in your brand.

如果你将你的目的品牌扩展到做不同工作的产品上——例如，清新口气、美白牙齿和减少牙菌斑的牙膏——顾客可能会感到困惑，并对你的品牌失去信任。

To extend your brand without destroying it:

要在不破坏品牌的情况下扩展品牌，请执行以下操作：

•Develop different products that address a common job. Sony did this with its various generations of Walkman that helped con- sumers “Escape the chaos in my world.”

开发不同的产品来解决共同的工作。索尼通过几代随身听做到了这一点，帮助消费者“逃离我的世界的混乱”。

Identify new, related jobs and create purpose brands for them. Marriott International extended its hotel brand, originally built around full-service facilities designed for large meetings, to other types of hotels. Each new purpose brand had a name indicating the job it was designed to do. For instance, Courtyard Marriott was “hired” by individual business travelers seeking a clean, quiet place to get work done in the evening. Residence Inn was hired by longer-term travelers.

确定新的相关工作，并为其创建目标品牌。万豪国际酒店将其酒店品牌扩展到其他类型的酒店，该品牌最初围绕为大型会议设计的全方位服务设施而建立。每一个新的目的品牌都有一个名字，表明它被设计要做的工作。例如，万怡酒店（Courtyard Marriott）的受众是由寻求一个干净、安静的地方在晚上完成工作的个人商务旅行者。而Residence Inn的受众是长期旅行者。

Marketing executives focus too much on ever-narrower demographic segments and ever-more-trivial product extensions. They should find out, instead, what jobs consumers need to get done. Those jobs will point the way to purposeful products—and genuine innovation.

营销主管过于关注越来越狭窄的人群和越来越琐碎的产品扩展。相反，他们应该找出消费者需要完成哪些工作。这些工作将为有目的的产品和真正的创新指明道路。

个人思考：文中指出三种营销方式一是观察消费者需求和行为并改变营销方式满足消费者需求，二是利用广告开拓消费者新的需求，三是确认品牌目标消费群体并围绕其开展活动。

Thirty thousand new consumer products are launched each year. But over 90% of them fail— and that’s after marketing professionals have spent massive amounts of money trying to understand what their customers want. What’s wrong with this picture? Is it that market researchers aren’t smart enough? That advertising agencies aren’t creative enough? That consumers have become too difficult to under- stand? We don’t think so. We believe, instead, that some of the fundamental paradigms of marketing—the methods that most of us learned to segment markets, build brands, and understand customers—are broken. We’re not alone in that judgment. Even Procter & Gamble CEO A.G. Lafley, arguably the best-positioned person in the world to make this call, says, “We need to reinvent the way we market to consumers. We need a new model.”

每年推出三万种新的消费品。但超过90%的营销失败了——这是在营销专业人士花费大量资金试图了解他们的客户想要什么之后。这张图怎么了？是市场研究人员不够聪明吗？广告公司不够有创意？消费者变得难以理解？我们不这么认为。相反，我们认为，营销的一些基本范式——我们大多数人学会的细分市场、建立品牌和了解客户的方法——被打破了。我们并不是唯一做出这种判断的人。甚至宝洁公司首席执行官A.G.拉弗利可以说是世界上最有资格做出这一决定的人，他说：“我们需要重塑我们向消费者营销的方式。我们需要一种新的模式。”

To build brands that mean something to customers, you need to attach them to products that mean something to customers. And to do that, you need to segment markets in ways that reflect how customers actually live their lives. In this article, we will propose a way to reconfigure the principles of market segmentation. We’ll describe how to create products that customers will consistently value. And finally, we will describe how new, valuable brands can be built to truly deliver sustained, profitable growth.

打造对消费者有意义的品牌客户，您需要将它们附加到对客户有意义的产品上。为此，您需要以反映客户实际生活方式的方式对市场进行细分。在本文中，我们将提出一种重新配置市场细分原则的方法。我们将描述如何创造客户始终如一重视的产品。最后，我们将描述如何建立新的、有价值的品牌，以真正实现持续的、盈利的增长。

个人总结：文章认为营销失败是因为错误细分市场，因此需要改变配置市场细分的原则，打造价值品牌。

Broken Paradigms of Market Segmentation 打破市场细分范式

The great Harvard marketing professor Theodore Levitt used to tell his students, “People don’t want to buy a quarter-inch drill. They want a quarter-inch hole!” Every marketer we know agrees with Levitt’s insight. Yet these same people segment their markets by type of drill and by price point; they measure market share of drills, not holes; and they benchmark the features and functions of their drill, not their hole, against those of rivals. They then set to work offering more features and functions in the belief that these will translate into better pricing and market share. When marketers do this, they often solve the wrong problems, improving their products in ways that are irrelevant to their customers’ needs.

伟大的哈佛营销学教授奥多雷·莱维特曾经告诉他的学生：“人们不想买四分之一英寸的钻头，他们想要四分之一英寸的洞！”我们认识的每个营销人员都同意莱维特的见解。然而，这些人根据钻头类型和价格来细分市场；他们衡量钻头的市场份额，而不是孔；他们将钻头的特性和功能（而不是孔）与竞争对手的特性和功能进行比较。然后，他们开始提供更多的特性和功能，相信这些将转化为更好的定价和市场份额。当营销人员这样做时，他们通常会解决错误的问题，以与客户需求无关的方式改进产品。

Segmenting markets by type of customer is no better. Having sliced business clients into small, medium, and large enterprises—or having shoehorned consumers into age, gender, or lifestyle brackets—marketers busy themselves with trying to understand the needs of representative customers in those segments and then create products that address those needs. The problem is that customers don’t conform their desires to match those of the average consumer in their demographic segment. When marketers design a product to address the needs of a typical customer in a demographically defined segment, therefore, they cannot know whether any specific individual will buy the product—they can only express a likelihood of purchase in probabilistic terms.

按客户类型细分市场也好不到哪里去。营销人员将商业客户分为小型、中型和大型企业，或者将消费者硬塞进年龄、性别或生活方式的不同类别，忙于了解这些细分市场中代表性客户的需求，然后创造满足这些需求的产品。问题在于，消费者的愿望并不符合他们所在人群中的普通消费者的愿望。因此，当营销人员设计产品以满足人口统计学定义的细分市场中典型客户的需求时，他们无法知道是否有任何特定的个人会购买该产品——他们只能用概率术语来表达购买的可能性。

Thus the prevailing methods of segmenta- tion that budding managers learn in business schools and then practice in the marketing de- partments of good companies are actually a key reason that new product innovation has become a gamble in which the odds of win- ning are horrifyingly low.

因此，初露头角的经理人在商学院学习，然后在优秀公司的营销部门实践的流行细分方法，实际上是新产品创新成为一场胜算低得吓人的赌博的关键原因。

There is a better way to think about market segmentation and new product innovation. The structure of a market, seen from the customers’ point of view, is very simple: They just need to get things done, as Ted Levitt said. When people find themselves needing to get a job done, they essentially hire products to do that job for them. The marketer’s task is there- fore to understand what jobs periodically arise in customers’ lives for which they might hire products the company could make. If a marketer can understand the job, design a product and associated experiences in purchase and use to do that job, and deliver it in a way that reinforces its intended use, then when customers find themselves needing to get that job done, they will hire that product.

有一个更好的方法来思考市场细分和新产品创新。从顾客的角度来看，市场的结构非常简单：正如特德·莱维特所说，他们只需要把事情做好。当人们发现自己需要完成一项工作时，他们本质上是雇佣产品来完成这项工作。因此，营销人员的任务是了解客户生活中周期性出现的工作，他们可能会雇佣公司生产的产品。如果营销人员能够理解这项工作，设计一种产品以及相关的购买和使用体验来完成这项工作，并以一种强化其预期用途的方式交付它，那么当客户发现自己需要完成这项工作时，他们就会雇佣该产品。

Since most new-product developers don’t think in those terms, they’ve become much too good at creating products that don’t help customers do the jobs they need to get done. Here’s an all-too-typical example. In the mid- 1990s, Scott Cook presided over the launch of a software product called the Quicken Financial Planner, which helped customers create a retirement plan. It flopped. Though it captured over 90% of retail sales in its product category, annual revenue never surpassed $2 million,and it was eventually pulled from the market.

由于大多数新产品开发人员不会从这些角度思考问题，他们已经变得太擅长创造产品，而这些产品并不能帮助客户完成他们需要完成的工作。这是一个非常典型的例子。20世纪90年代中期，斯科特·库克主持推出了一款名为Quicken Financial Planner的软件产品，帮助客户制定退休计划。尽管它占据了其产品类别零售额的90%以上，但年收入从未超过200万美元，最终被撤出市场。

What happened? Was the $49 price too high? Did the product need to be easier to use? Maybe. A more likely explanation, however, is that while the demographics suggested that lots of families needed a financial plan, con- structing one actually wasn’t a job that most people were looking to do. The fact that they should have a financial plan, or even that they said they should have a plan, didn’t matter. In hindsight, the fact that the design team had had trouble finding enough “planners” to fill a focus group should have tipped Cook off. Mak- ing it easier and cheaper for customers to do things that they are not trying to do rarely leads to success.

怎么回事？49美元的价格太高了吗？产品需要更容易使用吗？也许吧。然而，一个更可能的解释是，尽管人口统计数据表明许多家庭需要一个财务计划，但实际上大多数人并不想做一个财务计划。事实上，他们应该有一个财务计划，甚至他们说他们应该有一个计划，这并不重要。事后看来，设计团队很难找到足够的“策划者”来组建一个焦点小组，这一事实应该会让库克告密。让顾客更容易、更便宜地做他们不想做的事情，很少会带来成功。

个人总结：产品推广营销的时候应该考虑消费者需求，以及意愿。

Designing Products That Do the Job With few exceptions, every job people need or want to do has a social, a functional, and an emotional dimension. If marketers under- stand each of these dimensions, then they can

除了少数例外，人们需要或想要做的每一项工作都有社交、功能和情感层面。如果营销人员理解了这些维度中的每一个，那么他们就可以

design a product that’s precisely targeted to the job. In other words, the job, not the customer, is the fundamental unit of analysis for a marketer who hopes to develop products that customers will buy.

设计一个精确针对工作的产品。换句话说，对于希望开发出顾客会购买的产品的营销人员来说，工作而不是顾客才是分析的基本单位。

To see why, consider one fast-food restau- rant’s effort to improve sales of its milk shakes. (In this example, both the company and the product have been disguised.) Its marketers first defined the market segment by product— milk shakes—and then segmented it further by profiling the demographic and personality characteristics of those customers who fre- quently bought milk shakes. Next, they invited people who fit this profile to evaluate whether making the shakes thicker, more chocolaty, cheaper, or chunkier would satisfy them bet- ter. The panelists gave clear feedback, but the consequent improvements to the product had no impact on sales.

要了解原因，请考虑一家快餐店为提高奶昔销量所做的努力。（在这个例子中，公司和产品都被伪装了。）其营销人员首先通过产品——奶昔——来定义细分市场，然后通过分析那些经常购买奶昔的顾客的人口统计和个性特征来进一步细分市场。接下来，他们邀请符合这一特征的人来评估是否让奶昔更浓、更有巧克力味、更便宜或更厚实会让他们更满意。小组成员给出了明确的反馈，但随之而来的产品改进对销售没有影响。

A new researcher then spent a long day in a restaurant seeking to understand the jobs that customers were trying to get done when they hired a milk shake. He chronicled when each milk shake was bought, what other products the customers purchased, whether these con- sumers were alone or with a group, whether they consumed the shake on the premises or drove off with it, and so on. He was surprised to find that 40% of all milk shakes were pur- chased in the early morning. Most often, these early-morning customers were alone; they did not buy anything else; and they consumed their shakes in their cars.
然后，一名新的研究人员在一家餐馆花了一整天的时间，试图了解顾客在雇佣奶昔时试图完成的工作。他记录了每份奶昔的购买时间，顾客还购买了哪些其他产品，这些消费者是独自一人还是与一群人在一起，他们是在店内消费奶昔还是带着奶昔离开，等等。他惊讶地发现，40%的奶昔是在清晨购买的。大多数情况下，这些清晨的顾客是独自一人；他们做到了不买别的；他们在车里喝奶昔。

The researcher then returned to interview the morning customers as they left the restaurant, shake in hand, in an effort to understand what caused them to hire a milk shake. Most bought it to do a similar job: They faced a long, boring commute and needed some- thing to make the drive more interesting. They weren’t yet hungry but knew that they would be by 10 AM; they wanted to consume something now that would stave off hunger until noon. And they faced constraints: They were in a hurry, they were wearing work clothes, and they had (at most) one free hand. The researcher inquired further: “Tell me about a time when you were in the same situation but you didn’t buy a milk shake. What did you buy instead?” Sometimes, he learned, they bought a bagel. But bagels were too dry. Bagels with cream cheese or jam resulted in sticky fingers and gooey steering wheels. Sometimes these commuters bought a banana, but it didn’t last long enough to solve the boring- commute problem. Doughnuts didn’t carry people past the 10 AM hunger attack. The milk shake, it turned out, did the job better than any of these competitors. It took people 20 minutes to suck the viscous milk shake through the thin straw, addressing the boring- commute problem. They could consume it cleanly with one hand. By 10:00, they felt less hungry than when they tried the alternatives. It didn’t matter much that it wasn’t a healthy food, because becoming healthy wasn’t essential to the job they were hiring the milk shake to do.

然后，研究人员回来采访早上离开餐厅的顾客，手里拿着奶昔，试图了解是什么导致他们雇佣了奶昔。大多数人购买它是为了做类似的工作：他们面临着漫长而无聊的通勤，需要一些东西让驾驶变得更有趣。他们还不饿，但知道他们会在上午10点；他们现在想吃一些东西，这样可以在中午之前避免饥饿。他们面临着限制：他们很匆忙，他们穿着工作服，他们（最多）有一只空闲的手。研究人员进一步询问：“告诉我有一次你处于同样的情况，但你没有买奶昔。你买了什么？”他了解到，有时他们会买一个百吉饼。但是百吉饼太干了。加了奶油奶酪或果酱的百吉饼会导致手指和方向盘粘粘的。有时这些通勤者会买一根香蕉，但它并没有持续足够长的时间来解决无聊的通勤问题。甜甜圈不会让人们度过上午10点的饥饿袭击。事实证明，这种奶昔比这些竞争对手中的任何一个都做得更好。人们花了20分钟通过细吸管吮吸粘稠的奶昔，解决了无聊的通勤问题。他们可以用一只手干干净净地吃掉它。到了10点，他们感觉比尝试其他替代品时不那么饿了。它不是一种健康食品并不重要，因为变得健康对他们雇佣奶昔的工作来说并不重要。

The researcher observed that at other times of the day parents often bought milk shakes, in addition to complete meals, for their children. What job were the parents trying to do? They were exhausted from repeatedly having to say “no” to their kids. They hired milk shakes as an innocuous way to placate their children and feel like loving parents. The researcher ob- served that the milk shakes didn’t do this job very well, though. He saw parents waiting impatiently after they had finished their own meals while their children struggled to suck the thick shakes up through the thin straws.

研究人员观察到，在一天中的其他时间，除了正餐之外，父母还经常为他们的孩子购买奶昔。父母想做什么工作？他们因为不得不反复对孩子说“不”而筋疲力尽。他们购买奶昔作为一种无害的方式来安抚他们的孩子，感觉像慈爱的父母。然而，研究人员观察到，奶昔并没有很好地完成这项工作。他看到父母们吃完饭后不耐烦地等待着，而他们的孩子则费力地用细吸管吮吸着浓稠的奶昔。

Customers were hiring milk shakes for two very different jobs. But when marketers had originally asked individual customers who hired a milk shake for either or both jobs which of its attributes they should improve— and when these responses were averaged with those of other customers in the targeted demo- graphic segment—it led to a one-size-fits-none product.

顾客为两份截然不同的工作雇佣奶昔。但是当营销人员最初询问那些雇佣奶昔来做其中一项或两项工作的个人顾客时他们应该改进哪些属性——以及当这些响应与目标演示细分市场中其他客户的响应进行平均时——这导致了一个“一刀切”的产品。

Once they understood the jobs the customers were trying to do, however, it became very clear which improvements to the milk shake would get those jobs done even better and which were irrelevant. How could they tackle the boring-commute job? Make the milk shake even thicker, so it would last longer. And swirl in tiny chunks of fruit, adding a dimension of unpredictability and anticipation to the monotonous morning routine. Just as important, the restaurant chain could deliver the product more effectively by moving the dispensing ma- chine in front of the counter and selling customers a prepaid swipe card so they could dash in, “gas up,” and go without getting stuck in the drive-through lane. Addressing the midday and evening job to be done would entail a very different product, of course.

然而，一旦他们理解了顾客试图做的工作，就很清楚哪些对奶昔的改进会让这些工作做得更好，哪些是无关紧要的。他们如何应对无聊的通勤工作？把奶昔弄得更浓，这样会持续更久。并在小块水果中旋转，为单调的早晨例行公事增添了不可预测性和期待性。同样重要的是，连锁餐厅可以通过将自动售货机移到柜台前，向顾客出售预付费刷卡，这样他们就可以冲进去“加油”，而不会被困在免下车车道上，从而更有效地交付产品。当然，解决中午和晚上要做的工作需要一个非常不同的产品。

By understanding the job and improving the product’s social, functional, and emotional dimensions so that it did the job better, the company’s milk shakes would gain share against the real competition—not just competing chains’ milk shakes but bananas, boredom, and bagels. This would grow the category, which brings us to an important point: Job-defined markets are generally much larger than product category-defined markets. Marketers who are stuck in the mental trap that equates market size with product categories don’t understand whom they are competing against from the customer’s point of view. Notice that knowing how to improve the product did not come from understanding the “typical” customer. It came from understanding the job. Need more evidence?  

通过理解工作，改善产品的社交、功能和情感维度，使其更好地完成工作，公司的奶昔将在真正的竞争中获得份额——不仅仅是与连锁店的奶昔竞争，还有香蕉、boredom和百吉饼竞争。这将扩大类别，这将我们带到一个重要的观点：工作定义的市场通常比产品类别定义的市场大得多。营销人员陷入了将市场规模等同于产品类别的思维陷阱，无法从客户的角度理解他们在与谁竞争。请注意，知道如何改进产品并不是来自于了解“典型”客户。它来自于理解这项工作。需要更多证据吗？

个人总结：营销产品、改进商品重要的是理解客户、理解工作。

Pierre Omidyar did not design eBay for the “auction psychographic.” He founded it to help people sell personal items. Google was de- signed for the job of finding information, not for a “search demographic.” The unit of analy- sis in the work that led to Procter & Gamble’s stunningly successful Swiffer was the job of cleaning floors, not a demographic or psycho- graphic study of people who mop.

皮埃尔·奥米迪亚并没有为“拍卖心理”设计eBay。他创建它是为了帮助人们出售个人物品。谷歌是为寻找信息而设计的，而不是为“搜索人群”而设计的。宝洁公司的Swiffer取得了惊人的成功，这项工作的分析单位是清洁地板的工作，而不是对拖地者进行人口统计学或心理统计学研究。

Why do so many marketers try to understand the consumer rather than the job? One reason may be purely historical: In some of the markets in which the tools of modern market research were formulated and tested, such as feminine hygiene or baby care, the job was so closely aligned with the customer demo- graphic that if you understood the customer, you would also understand the job. This coincidence is rare, however. All too frequently, marketers’ focus on the customer causes them to target phantom needs.

为什么这么多营销人员试图了解消费者而不是工作？一个原因可能纯粹是历史的：在一些市场中，现代市场工具研究被制定和测试，如女性卫生或婴儿护理，工作与客户演示如此紧密地结合在一起，如果你理解了客户，你也就理解了工作。然而，这种巧合是罕见的。很多时候，营销人员对客户的关注导致他们瞄准虚幻的需求。

How a Job Focus Can Grow Product Categories 工作重点如何扩大产品类别

New growth markets are created when innovating companies design a product and position its brand on a job for which no optimal product yet exists. In fact, companies that historically have segmented and measured the size of their markets by product category generally find that when they instead segment by job, their market is much larger (and their cur- rent share of the job is much smaller) than they had thought. This is great news for smart companies hungry for growth.

当创新公司设计一种产品并将其品牌定位在一项尚不存在最佳产品的工作上时，新的增长市场就产生了。事实上，历史上按产品类别细分和衡量市场规模的公司通常会发现，当他们改为按工作进行细分时，他们的市场比他们想象的要大得多（而他们目前的工作份额要小得多）。对于渴望增长的聪明公司来说，这是个好消息。

Understanding and targeting jobs was the key to Sony founder Akio Morita’s approach to disruptive innovation. Morita never did con- ventional market research. Instead, he and his associates spent much of their time watching what people were trying to get done in their lives, then asking themselves whether Sony’s electronics miniaturization technology could help them do these things better, easier, and cheaper. Morita would have badly misjudged the size of his market had he simply analyzed trends in the number of tape players being sold before he launched his Walkman. This should trigger an action item on every mar- keter’s to-do list: Turn off the computer, get out of the office, and observe.

理解和瞄准乔布斯是索尼创始人盛田昭夫颠覆性创新方法的关键。森田从未做过传统的市场调查。相反，他和他的同事们花了很多时间观察人们在生活中想要完成的事情，然后问自己，索尼的电子小型化技术可以帮助他们更好、更容易、更便宜地做这些事情。如果森田在推出随身听之前只是简单地分析了磁带播放器销售数量的趋势，他就会严重误判他的市场规模。这应该会触发每个营销人员待办事项清单上的一项行动：关掉电脑，离开办公室，观察。

个人总结：营销人员应该注重工作细分，而不是产品类别细分，应该注重观察消费者。

Consider how Church & Dwight used this strategy to grow its baking soda business. The company has produced Arm & Hammer baking soda since the 1860s; its iconic yellow box and Vulcan’s hammer-hefting arm have be- come enduring visual cues for “the standard of purity.” In the late 1960s, market research director Barry Goldblatt tells us, management began observational research to understand the diverse circumstances in which consumers found themselves with a job to do where Arm & Hammer could be hired to help. They found a few consumers adding the product to laundry detergent, a few others mixing it into toothpaste, some sprinkling it on the carpet, and still others placing open boxes in the refrigerator. There was a plethora of jobs out there needing to get done, but most customers did not know that they could hire Arm & Hammer baking soda for these cleaning and fresh-

想想Church&Dwight如何利用这一策略来发展其小苏打业务。该公司自19世纪60年代以来一直生产Arm&Hammer小苏打；它标志性的黄色盒子和火神的提锤臂已经成为“纯洁标准”的经久不衰的视觉线索。市场研究总监巴里·戈德布拉特（Barry Goldblatt）告诉我们，在20世纪60年代末，管理层开始了观察性研究，以了解消费者发现自己有工作要做的不同情况，而Arm&Hammer可以用于不同情况。他们发现一些消费者将该产品添加到洗衣粉中，一些人将其混合到牙膏中，一些人将其洒在地毯上，还有一些人将打开的盒子放在冰箱中。有太多的工作需要完成，但大多数顾客不知道他们可以购买Arm&Hammer小苏打来做这些清洁和新鲜的工作。

Purpose Brands and Disruptive Innovations目的品牌和颠覆性创新

We have written elsewhere about how to harness the potential of disruptive innovations to create growth. Because disruptive innovations are products or services whose performance is not as good as mainstream products, executives of leading companies often hesitate to introduce them for fear of destroying the value of their brands. This fear is generally unfounded, provided that companies attach a unique purpose brand to their disruptive innovations.

我们在其他地方已经写过关于如何利用颠覆性创新的潜力来创造增长的文章。由于破坏性创新是指性能不如主流产品的产品或服务，领先公司的高管往往不愿引入它们，因为担心破坏其品牌价值。这种担心通常是没有根据的，前提是公司在其颠覆性创新上附加了一个独特的目的品牌。

Purpose branding has been the key, for ex- ample, to Kodak’s success with two disruptions. The first was its single-use camera, a classic disruptive technology. Because of its inexpensive plastic lenses, the new camera couldn’t take the quality of photographs that a good 35-millimeter camera could produce on Kodak film. The proposition to launch a single-use camera encountered vigorous op- position within Kodak’s film division. The

例如，目的品牌是柯达成功的关键，有两个颠覆。首先是它的一次性相机，这是一项经典的颠覆性技术。由于其廉价的塑料镜头，新相机拍出的照片质量不如一台35毫米的柯达胶卷相机。推出一次性相机的提议遭到了柯达胶卷部门的强烈反对。

The corporation finally gave responsibility for the opportunity to a completely different organizational unit, which launched single-use cam- eras with a purpose brand—the Kodak Fun- Saver. This was a product customers could hire when they needed to save memories of a fun time but had forgotten to bring a camera or didn’t want to risk harming their expensive one. Creating a purpose brand for a disruptive job differentiated the product, clarified its intended use, delighted the customers, and thereby strengthened the endorsing power of the Kodak brand. Quality, after all, can only be measured relative to the job that needs to be done and the alternatives that can be hired to do it. (Sadly, a few years ago, Kodak pushed aside the FunSaver purpose brand in favor of the word “Max,” which now appears on its single-use cameras, perhaps to focus on selling film rather than the job the film is for. )

公司最终将这一机会的责任交给了一个完全不同的组织单位，该单位推出了带有专用品牌的一次性相机——柯达Fun-Saver。当顾客需要保存快乐时光的记忆，但忘记带相机或不想冒险损坏他们昂贵的相机时，他们可以租用这款产品。为一项颠覆性的工作创造一个有目的的品牌，使产品与众不同，明确了其预期用途，取悦了顾客，从而增强了柯达品牌的代言力。毕竟，质量只能相对于需要完成的工作和可以雇佣的替代方案来衡量。（可悲的是，几年前，柯达放弃了FunSaver purpose品牌，转而使用“Max”一词，这个词现在出现在其一次性相机上，也许是为了专注于销售胶卷而不是胶卷的用途。）

Kodak scored another purpose-branding victory with its disruptive EasyShare digital camera. The company initially had struggled for differentiation and market share in the head-on megapixel and megazoom race against Japanese digital camera makers (all of whom aggressively advertised their corporate brands but had no purpose brands).

柯达凭借其颠覆性的EasyShare数码相机取得了另一个品牌胜利。该公司最初在与日本数码相机制造商（所有这些制造商都积极宣传其公司品牌，但没有目的品牌）的正面竞争中，努力争取差异化和市场份额。

Kodak then adopted a disruptive strategy that was focused on a job—sharing fun. It made an inexpensive digital camera that cutomers could slip into a cradle, click “attach” in their computer’s e-mail program, and share photos effortlessly with friends and relatives. Sharing fun, not preserving the high- est resolution images for posterity, is the job—and Kodak’s EasyShare purpose brand guides customers to a product tailored to do that job. Kodak is now the market share leader in digital cameras in the United States.

柯达随后采取了一种颠覆性的策略，专注于工作分享的乐趣。它制造了一种廉价的数码相机，顾客可以把它放进支架里，在电脑的电子邮件程序中点击“附加”，毫不费力地与朋友和亲戚分享照片。分享乐趣，而不是为后代保留最高分辨率的图像，才是工作——柯达的EasyShare purpose品牌引导客户选择专为这项工作而定制的产品。柯达现在是美国数码相机市场份额的领导者。

个人总结：营销人员实施破坏性创新需要聚焦于工作类别细分，明确品牌目的。

ening jobs. The single product just wasn’t giving customers the guidance they needed, given the many jobs it could be hired to do.

就业机会。考虑到它可以被雇佣去做的许多工作，单一产品并不能给客户提供他们需要的指导。

Today, a family of job-focused Arm & Ham- mer products has greatly grown the baking soda product category. These jobs include:

如今，一系列以工作为中心的Arm&Hammer产品极大地扩展了小苏打产品类别。这些工作包括：

•Help my mouth feel fresh and clean (Arm & Hammer Complete Care toothpaste)

帮助我的口腔感觉清新干净（Arm&Hammer Complete Care牙膏）

•Deodorize my refrigerator (Arm & Ham- mer Fridge-n-Freezer baking soda)

给我的冰箱除臭（Arm&Ham-Mer冰箱和冰柜小苏打）

•Help my underarms stay clean and fresh (Arm & Hammer Ultra Max deodorant)

帮助我的腋下保持清洁和清新（Arm&Hammer Ultra Max除臭剂）

•Clean and freshen my carpets (Arm & Hammer Vacuum Free carpet deodorizer)

清洁和清新我的地毯（Arm&Hammer真空无地毯除臭剂）

•Deodorize kitty litter (Arm & Hammer Super Scoop cat litter)

除臭猫砂（Arm&Hammer超级勺猫砂）

•Make my clothes smell fresh (Arm & Ham- mer Laundry Detergent).

让我的衣服闻起来清新（Arm&Hammer洗衣液）。

The yellow-box baking soda business is now less than 10% of Arm & Hammer’s consumer revenue. The company’s share price has appreciated at nearly four times the average rate of its nearest rivals, P&G, Unilever, and Colgate-Palmolive. Although the overall Arm & Hammer brand is valuable in each instance, the key to this extraordinary growth is a set of job-focused products and a communication strategy that help people realize that when they find themselves needing to get one of these jobs done, here is a product that they can trust to do it well.

黄盒小苏打业务目前不到Arm&Hammer消费者收入的10%。该公司的股价几乎是其最接近的竞争对手宝洁、联合利华和高露洁棕榄平均价格的四倍。尽管整个Arm&Hammer品牌在每一种情况下都很有价值，但这种非凡增长的关键是一套以工作为中心的产品和一种沟通策略，帮助人们认识到，当他们发现自己需要完成其中一项工作时，这里有一种他们可以信赖的产品可以做得很好。

Building Brands That Customers Will Hire 打造客户会购买的品牌

Sometimes, the discovery that one needs to get a job done is conscious, rational, and explicit. At other times, the job is so much a part of a routine that customers aren’t really consciously aware of it. Either way, if consumers are lucky, when they discover the job they need to do, a branded product will exist that is perfectly and unambiguou sly suited to do it. We call the brand of a product that is tightly associated with the job for which it is meant to be hired a purpose brand.

有时候，发现一个人需要完成一项工作是有意识的、理性的、明确的。在其他时候，这项工作是日常工作的一部分，以至于客户并没有真正意识到这一点。无论哪种方式，如果消费者幸运的话，当他们发现他们需要做的工作时，就会有一种品牌产品完美而明确地适合做这件事。我们把与购买工作密切相关的产品品牌称为目的品牌。

The history of Federal Express illustrates how successful purpose brands are built. A job had existed practically forever: the I-need-to-send- this-from-here-to-there-with-perfect-certainty- as-fast-as-possible job. Some U.S. customers hired the U.S. Postal Service’s airmail to do this job; a few desperate souls paid couriers to sit on airplanes. Others even went so far as to plan ahead so they could ship via UPS trucks. But each of these alternatives was kludgy, expensive, uncertain, or inconvenient. Because no- body had yet designed a service to do this job well, the brands of the unsatisfactory alternative services became tarnished when they were hired for this purpose. But after Federal Express designed its service to do that exact job, and did it wonderfully again and again, the FedEx brand began popping into people’s minds whenever they needed to get that job done. FedEx became a purpose brand—in fact, it be- came a verb in the international language of business that is inextricably linked with that specific job. It is a very valuable brand as a result.

联邦快递的历史说明了成功的目的品牌是如何建立的。有一项工作几乎永远存在：我需要以最快的速度将这个从这里发送到那里，并且非常确定。一些美国客户雇佣了美国邮政服务的航空邮件来做这项工作；一些绝望的灵魂付钱给快递员坐飞机。其他人甚至提前计划，这样他们就可以通过UPS卡车运输。但是这些选择中的每一个都是笨拙的、昂贵的、不确定的或不方便的。因为还没有人设计出一种服务来很好地完成这项工作，当这些不令人满意的替代服务被雇佣来完成这项工作时，它们的品牌就被玷污了。但在联邦快递设计了它的服务来完成这项工作，并一次又一次地出色地完成这项工作后，每当人们需要完成这项工作时，联邦快递品牌就开始出现在他们的脑海中。联邦快递成了一个目的品牌——事实上，它成了国际商业语言中的一个动词，与特定的工作有着千丝万缕的联系。因此，这是一个非常有价值的品牌。

个人思考：文章通过联邦快递的案例说明企业如何打造客户会购买的品牌，如何成就目的品牌。

Most of today’s great brands—Crest, Star- bucks, Kleenex, eBay, and Kodak, to name a few—started out as just this kind of purpose brand. The product did the job, and customers talked about it. This is how brand equity is built.

今天大多数伟大的品牌——佳洁士、星巴克、面巾纸、易贝和柯达，仅举几例——都是从这种目的品牌开始的。产品完成了工作，客户也在谈论它。品牌资产就是这样建立起来的。

Brand equity can be destroyed when marketers don’t tie the brand to a purpose. When they seek to build a general brand that does not signal to customers when they should and should not buy the product, marketers run the risk that people might hire their product to do a job it was not designed to do. This causes customers to distrust the brand—as was the case for years with the post office.

当营销人员没有将品牌与目标联系起来时，品牌资产就会被摧毁。当营销人员试图建立一个通用品牌，不向客户表明他们什么时候应该购买产品，什么时候不应该购买产品时，他们就会冒这样的风险：人们可能会雇佣他们的产品来做一件不是设计出来的事情。这导致顾客不信任品牌——就像多年来邮局的情况一样。

A clear purpose brand is like a two-sided compass. One side guides customers to the right products. The other side guides the company’s product designers, marketers, and advertisers as they develop and market improved and new versions of their products. A good purpose brand clarifies which features and functions are relevant to the job and which potential improvements will prove irrelevant. The price premium that the brand commands is the wage that customers are willing to pay the brand for providing this guidance on both sides of the compass.

一个目标明确的品牌就像一个双面指南针。一方引导客户找到合适的产品。另一方则指导公司的产品设计师、营销人员和广告商开发和营销其产品的改进和新版本。一个好的目的品牌明确了哪些特性和功能与工作相关，哪些潜在的改进将被证明是不相关的。品牌要求的溢价是客户愿意为品牌在指南针两侧提供这种指导而支付的工资。

个人总结：目的品牌不仅仅是单方向寻找客户需求的过程，而是企业和客户双方互相磨合，企业帮助顾客找到合适的产品，企业设计符合客户预期的产品。

The need to feel a certain way—to feel macho, sassy, pampered, or prestigious—is a job that arises in many of our lives on occasion. When we find ourselves needing to do one of these jobs, we can hire a branded product whose purpose is to provide such feelings. Gucci, Absolut, Montblanc, and Virgin, for ex- ample, are purpose brands. They link customers who have one of these jobs to do with experiences in purchase and use that do those jobs well. These might be called aspirational jobs. In some aspirational situations, it is the brand itself, more than the functional dimensions of the product, that gets the job done.

需要以某种方式感受——感受马屁精、时髦、养尊处优或有声望——是我们许多人生活中偶尔会出现的一项工作。当我们发现自己需要做这些工作之一时，我们可以雇佣一个品牌产品，其目的就是提供这样的感觉。例如，Gucci、Absolut、万宝龙和Virgin都是目的品牌。他们将从事其中一项工作的客户与擅长这些工作的购买和使用经验联系起来。这些可能被称为理想的工作。在某些令人向往的情况下，是品牌本身来完成工作，而不是产品的功能维度。

The Role of Advertising 广告的作用

Much advertising is wasted in the mistaken belief that it alone can build brands. Advertising cannot build brands, but it can tell people about an existing branded product’s ability to do a job well. That’s what the managers at Unilever’s Asian operations found out when they identified an important job that arose in the lives of many office workers at around 4:00 in the afternoon. Drained of physical and emotional energy, people still had to get a lot done before their workday ended. They needed something to boost their productivity, and they were hiring a range of caffeinated drinks, candy bars, stretch breaks, and conversation to do this job, with mixed results.

许多广告被浪费在错误的信念上，认为只有广告才能建立品牌。广告不能建立品牌，但它可以告诉人们现有品牌产品做好工作的能力。这是联合利华亚洲业务的经理们在下午4点左右确定了一项出现在许多办公室工作人员生活中的重要工作时发现的。体力和情绪都耗尽了，人们在工作日结束前还有很多事情要做。他们需要一些东西来提高他们的生产力，他们雇佣了一系列含咖啡因的饮料、糖果、伸展休息和谈话来完成这项工作，结果好坏参半。

Unilever designed a microwavable soup 联合利华设计了一种微波炉汤

Whose properties were tailored to that job— quick to fix, nutritious but not too filling, it can be consumed at your desk but gives you a bit of a break when you go to heat it up. It was launched into the workplace under the descriptive brand Soupy Snax. The results were mediocre. On a hunch, the brand’s managers then relaunched the product with advertisements showing lethargic workers perking up after using the product and renamed the brand Soupy Snax—4:00. The reaction of people who saw the advertisements was, “That’s exactly what happens to me at 4:00!” They needed something to help them consciously discover both the job and the product they could hire to do it. The tagline and ads trans- formed a brand that had been a simple description of a product into a purpose brand that clarified the nature of the job and the product that was designed to do it, and the product has become very successful.

它的特性是为这项工作量身定制的——快速修复，营养丰富但不会太饱，它可以在你的办公桌前食用，但当你去加热它时会让你休息一下。它以描述性品牌Soupy Snax进入工作场所。然而，结果一般。凭着一种预感，该品牌的经理们重新推出了该产品，并在广告中展示了昏昏欲睡的工人在使用该产品后恢复了活力，并将品牌更名为Soupy Snax-4：00。看到广告的人的反应是，“这正是我在4点发生的事情！”他们需要一些东西来帮助他们有意识地发现这份工作和他们可以雇佣的产品。标语和广告将一个简单描述产品的品牌转变为一个目的品牌，明确了工作的性质和为完成工作而设计的产品，产品变得非常成功。

Note the role that advertising played in this process. 请注意广告在这方面所起的作用过程

Advertising clarified the nature of the job and helped more people realize that they had the job to do. It informed people that there was a product designed to do that job and gave the product a name people could remember. Advertising is not a substitute for designing products that do specific jobs and ensuring that improvements in their features and functions are relevant to that job. The fact is that most great brands were built before their owners started advertising. Think of Disney, Harley-Davidson, eBay, and Google. Each brand developed a sterling reputation before much was spent on advertising.

广告澄清了工作的性质，帮助更多的人意识到他们有工作要做。它告诉人们有一种产品可以完成这项工作，并给产品起了一个人们可以记住的名字。广告不能替代设计完成特定工作的产品，并确保其特性和功能的改进与该工作相关。事实是，大多数伟大的品牌都是在它们的所有者开始做广告之前建立的。想想迪士尼、哈雷戴维森、易贝和谷歌。每个品牌往往在广告上投入大量资金之前，就建立了良好的声誉。

Advertising that attempts to short-circuit this process and build, as if from scratch, a brand that people will trust is a fool’s errand. Ford, Nissan, Macy’s, and many other companies invest hundreds of millions to keep the corporate name or their products’ names in the general consciousness of the buying public. Most of these companies’ products aren’t designed to do specific jobs and therefore aren’t usually differentiated from the competition. These firms have few purpose brands in their portfolios and no apparent strategies to create them. Their managers are unintentionally transferring billions in profits to branding agencies in the vain hope that they can buy their way to glory. What is worse, many companies have decided that building new brands is so expensive they will no longer do so. Brand building by advertising is indeed prohibitively expensive. But that’s because it’s the wrong way to build a brand.

试图缩短这一过程并建立一个人们信任的品牌的广告是徒劳的。福特、日产、梅西百货和许多其他公司投资数亿美元，以保持公司名称或产品名称在购买者的普遍意识中。这些公司的大多数产品都不是为特定的工作而设计的，因此通常不会从竞争对手中脱颖而出。这些公司的投资组合中几乎没有目的品牌，也没有创建这些品牌的明显策略。他们的经理无意中将数十亿美元的利润转移给品牌代理商，徒劳地希望他们可以通过购买获得荣耀。更糟糕的是，许多公司已经决定，建立新品牌的成本太高，他们将不再这样做。通过广告建立品牌确实昂贵得令人望而却步。但那是因为这是建立品牌的错误方式。

个人总结：企业通常认为广告是建立品牌的途径，然而现实上企业在广告营销前一般已经建立品牌。

Marketing mavens are fond of saying that brands are hollow words into which meaning gets stuffed. Beware. Executives who think that brand advertising is an effective mechanism for stuffing meaning into some word they have chosen to be their brand generally succeed in stuffing it full of vagueness. The ad agencies and media companies win big in this game, but the companies whose brands are getting stuffed generally find themselves trapped in an expensive, endless arms race with competitors whose brands are comparably vague.

营销专家喜欢说品牌是空洞的词语，里面塞满了意义。当心。高管们认为品牌广告是一种有效的机制，可以将意义塞进他们选择的品牌词汇中，但他们通常成功地塞进了一个充满模糊性的词汇。广告公司和媒体公司在这场游戏中大获全胜，但品牌被塞满的公司通常会发现自己陷入了一场昂贵的、无休止的军备竞赛中，而竞争对手的品牌相对模糊。

The exceptions to this brand-building rule are the purpose brands for aspirational jobs, where the brand must be built through images in advertising. The method for brand building that is appropriate for these jobs, however, has been wantonly and wastefully misapplied to the rest of the world of branding.

这一品牌建设规则的例外是有抱负的工作的目的品牌，在这种情况下，品牌必须通过广告中的图像来建立。然而，适合这些工作的品牌建设方法已经被肆意和浪费地误用到了品牌世界的其他地方。

Extending—Or Destroying—Brand Equity 扩大或破坏品牌资产

Once a strong purpose brand has been created, people within the company inevitably want to leverage it by applying it to other products. Executives should consider these proposals carefully. There are rules about the types of extensions that will reinforce the brand—and the types that will erode it.

一旦一个强大的目的品牌被创造出来，公司内部的人不可避免地想通过将它应用到其他产品中来利用它。高管们应该仔细考虑这些提议。有关于强化品牌的延伸类型和侵蚀品牌的类型的规则。

If a company chooses to extend a brand onto other products that can be hired to do the same job, it can do so without concern that the extension will compromise what the brand does. For example, Sony’s portable CD player, although a different product than its original Walkman-branded radio and cassette players, was positioned on the same job (the help-me- Escape-the-chaos-in-my-world job). So the new product caused the Walkman brand to pop even more instinctively into customers’ minds when they needed to get that job done. Had Sony not been asleep at the switch, a Walk- man-branded MP3 player would have further enhanced this purpose brand. It might even have kept Apple’s iPod purpose brand from preempting that job.

如果一家公司选择将品牌延伸到其他产品可以被雇佣来做同样的工作，它可以这样做，而不用担心扩展会损害品牌的工作。例如，索尼的便携式CD播放器，尽管与其最初的Walkman品牌收音机和卡带播放器是不同的产品，但定位于相同的工作（帮助我逃离我世界的混乱工作）。因此，当顾客需要完成这项工作时，新产品让随身听品牌更加本能地出现在他们的脑海中。如果索尼没有在需要实施转变时上睡着，Walk-Man品牌的MP3播放器将进一步增强这个目的品牌。它甚至可能阻止苹果的iPod品牌抢占这项工作。

The fact that purpose brands are job specific means that when a purpose brand is extended onto products that target different jobs, it will lose its clear meaning as a purpose brand and develop a different character instead—an endorser brand. An endorser brand can impart a general sense of quality, and it thereby creates some value in a marketing equation. But general endorser brands lose their ability to guide people who have a particular job to do to products that were designed to do it. Without appropriate guidance, customers will begin using endorser-branded products to do jobs they weren’t designed to do. The resulting bad experience will cause customers to distrust the brand. Hence, the value of an endorser brand will erode unless the company adds a second word to its brand architecture—a purpose brand alongside the endorser brand. Different jobs demand different purpose brands.

目的品牌是特定于工作的，这意味着当一个目的品牌扩展到针对不同工作的产品时，它将失去作为目的品牌的明确含义，而是发展出一个不同的特征——代言人品牌。代言人品牌可以传递一种普遍的质量感，从而在营销等式中创造一些价值。但是，一般的代言品牌失去了引导有特定工作要做的人去做产品的能力。如果没有适当的指导，客户将开始使用代言人品牌的产品来做他们不应该做的工作。由此产生的不良体验会导致顾客不信任品牌。因此，代言人品牌的价值将会下降，除非公司在其品牌架构中添加第二个词——除了代言人品牌之外的目的品牌。不同的工作需要不同的目的品牌。

Marriott International’s executives followed this principle when they sought to leverage the Marriott brand to address different jobs for which a hotel might be hired. Marriott had built its hotel brand around full-service facilities that were good to hire for large meetings. When it decided to extend its brand to other types of hotels, it adopted a two-word brand architecture that appended to the Marriott endorsement a purpose brand for each of the different jobs its new hotel chains were intended to do. Hence, individual business travelers who need to hire a clean, quiet place to get work done in the evening can hire Courtyard by Marriott—the hotel designed by business travelers for business travelers. Longer-term travelers can hire Residence Inn by Marriott, and so on. Even though these hotels were not constructed and decorated to the same premium standard as full-service Marriott hotels, the new chains actually reinforce the endorser qualities of the Marriott brand because they do the jobs well that they are hired to do.

当万豪国际的高管试图利用万豪品牌来解决酒店可能被雇佣的不同工作时，他们遵循了这一原则。万豪酒店围绕全方位服务设施打造了自己的酒店品牌，这些设施非常适合举办大型会议。当它决定将其品牌扩展到其他类型的酒店时，它采用了一种两个词的品牌架构，在万豪的背书上附加了一个目的品牌，用于其新连锁酒店打算做的每一项不同的工作。因此，需要租用一个干净、安静的地方在晚上完成工作的个人商务旅行者可以租用万豪酒店——由商务旅行者为商务旅行者设计的酒店。长期旅行者可以租用万豪酒店等。尽管这些酒店并不像万豪酒店结构和装饰，提供相同的全方位服务，实际上强化了万豪品牌的代言人品质，因为他们很好地完成了他们受雇做的工作。

Milwaukee Electric Tool has built purpose brands with two—and only two—of the products in its line of power tools. The Milwaukee Sawzall is a reciprocating saw that tradesmen hire when they need to cut through a wall quickly and aren’t sure what’s under the surface. Plumbers hire Milwaukee’s Hole Hawg, a right-angle drill, when they need to drill a hole in a tight space. Competitors like Black & Decker, Bosch, and Makita offer reciprocating saws and right-angle drills with comparable performance and price, but none of them has a purpose brand that pops into a tradesman’s mind when he has one of these jobs to do. Milwaukee has owned more than 80% of these two job markets for decades.

密尔沃基电动工具公司已经在其电动工具系列中建立了两种（也只有两种）产品的目的品牌。密尔沃基锯是一种往复锯，当商人需要快速切割墙壁并且不确定表面下是什么时，他们会使用这种锯。当水管工需要在狭小的空间钻孔时，他们会雇佣密尔沃基的Hole Hawg，一种直角钻机。像Black&Decker、Bosch和Makita这样的竞争对手提供了性能和价格相当的往复锯和直角钻，但当商人要做这些工作之一时，他们都没有一个专门的品牌突然出现在他的脑海中。几十年来，MilWaukee拥有这两个就业市场80%以上的份额。

个人总结：文章通过索尼、万豪国际以及密尔沃基电动工具公司的案例说明企业为何要建立品牌目的，怎么建立品牌目的。

Interestingly, Milwaukee offers under its endorser brand a full range of power tools, including circular saws, pistol-grip drills, sanders, and jigsaws. While the durability and relative price of these products are comparable to those of the Sawzall and Hole Hawg, Milwaukee has not built purpose brands for any of these other products. The market share of each is in the low single digits—a testament to the clarifying value of purpose brands versus the general connotation of quality that endorser brands confer. Indeed, a clear purpose brand is usually a more formidable competitive barrier than superior product performance—because competitors can copy performance much more easily than they can copy purpose brands.

有趣的是，密尔沃基以其En-Dorser品牌提供全系列电动工具，包括圆锯、**式钻、砂光机和竖锯。虽然这些产品的耐用性和相对价格与Sawzall和Hole Hawg相当，但Mil-Waukee尚未为任何其他产品建立专门的品牌。每一个品牌的市场份额都在低个位数——这证明了目的品牌相对于代言品牌赋予的一般质量内涵的澄清价值。事实上，一个明确的目的品牌通常是比卓越的产品性能更强大的竞争壁垒——因为竞争对手复制性能比复制目的品牌容易得多。

The tribulations and successes of P&G’s Crest brand is a story of products that ace the customer job, lose their focus, and then bounce back to become strong purpose brands again. Introduced in the mid-1950s, Crest was a classic disruptive technology. Its Fluoristan reinforced toothpaste made cavity-preventing fluoride treatments cheap and easy to apply at home, replacing an expensive and inconvenient trip to the dentist. Although P&G could have positioned the new product under its existing toothpaste brand, Gleem, its managers chose instead to build a new purpose brand, Crest, which was uniquely positioned on a job. Mothers who wanted to prevent cavities in their children’s teeth knew when they saw or heard the word “Crest” that this product was designed to do that job. Because it did the job so well, mothers grew to trust the product and in fact became suspicious of the ability of products without the Crest brand to do that job. This unambiguous association made it a very valuable brand, and Crest passed all its U.S. rivals to become the clear market leader in toothpaste for a generation.

P&G的佳洁士品牌的磨难和成功是一个产品的故事，这些产品超越了客户的工作，失去了他们的焦点，然后反弹回来，再次成为强大的目的品牌。Crest于20世纪50年代中期推出，是一项经典的颠覆性技术。它的氟化物强化牙膏使预防蛀牙的氟化物治疗变得便宜且易于在家中使用，取代了昂贵且不方便的牙医之旅。尽管P&G本可以将新产品定位在其现有的牙膏品牌Gleem下，但其经理们选择了建立一个新的目的品牌Crest，该品牌在工作中具有独特的定位。想要防止孩子牙齿出现蛀牙的妈妈们一看到或听到“佳洁士”这个词就知道这款产品是设计来做这项工作。因为它做得非常好，母亲们越来越信任这种产品，事实上，她们开始怀疑没有佳洁士品牌的产品是否有能力完成这项工作。这种明确的联系使它成为一个非常有价值的品牌，佳洁士通过了所有的美国竞争，成为一代人以来牙膏市场的明显领导者。

But one cannot sustain victory by standing still. Competitors eventually copied Crest’s cavity prevention abilities, turning cavity prevention into a commodity. Crest lost share as competitors innovated in other areas, including flavor, mouthfeel, and commonsense ingredients like baking soda. P&G began copying and advertising these attributes. But unlike Marriott, P&G did not append purpose brands to the general endorsement of Crest, and the brand began losing its distinctiveness.

但是一个人不能靠停滞不前来维持胜利。竞争对手最终复制了佳洁士的蛀牙预防能力，将蛀牙预防变成了一种商品。佳洁士失去了份额，因为竞争对手在其他领域进行了创新，包括风味、口感和小苏打等常识性成分。P&G开始复制和宣传这些属性。但与Marriott不同的是，P&G没有在佳洁士的一般代言中附加目的品牌，该品牌开始失去其独特性。

At the end of the 1990s, new Crest executives brought two disruptions to market, each with its own clear purpose brand. They acquired a start-up named Dr. John’s and re- branded its flagship electric toothbrush as the Crest SpinBrush, which they sold for $5—far below the price of competitors’ models of the time. They also launched Crest Whitestrips,

20世纪90年代末，新佳洁士高管给市场带来了两次颠覆，每一次都有自己明确的目标品牌。他们收购了一家名为Dr.John’s的初创公司，并将其旗舰电动牙刷更名为Crest SpinBrush，售价为5美元，远低于当时竞争对手的型号。他们还推出了佳洁士白条，

which allowed people to whiten their teeth at home for a mere $25, far less than dentists charged. With these purpose-branded innovations, Crest generated substantial new growth and regained share leadership in the entire tooth care category.

这使得人们可以在家美白牙齿，只需25美元，远低于牙医的收费。凭借这些专门品牌的创新，佳洁士产生了可观的新增长，并在整个牙齿护理类别中重新获得了份额领先地位。

The exhibit “Extending Brands Without Destroying Them” diagrams the two ways marketers can extend a purpose brand without eroding its value. The first option is to move up the vertical axis by developing different products that address a common job. This is what Sony did with its Walkman portable CD player. When Crest was still a clear purpose brand, P&G could have gone this route by, say, introducing a Crest-brand fluoride mouth rinse. The brand would have retained its clarity of purpose. But P&G did not, allowing Johnson & Johnson to insert yet another brand, ACT (its own fluoride mouth rinse), into the cavity-pre- vention job space. Because P&G pursued the second option, extending its brand along the horizontal axis to other jobs (whitening, breath freshening, and so on), the purpose brand morphed into an endorser brand.

“扩展品牌而不破坏品牌”的展览展示了营销人员在不侵蚀其价值的情况下扩展目标品牌的两种方式。第一种选择是通过开发解决共同工作的不同产品来向上移动垂直轴。这就是索尼对其随身听便携式CD播放器所做的。当佳洁士还是一个目标明确的品牌时，宝洁本可以走这条路，比如推出佳洁士品牌的含氟漱口水。该品牌将保持其明确的目标。但宝洁公司并没有允许强生公司将另一个品牌ACT（它自己的含氟漱口水）引入预防蛀牙的工作领域。因为P&G追求第二种选择，将其品牌沿着横轴延伸到其他工作（美白、口气清新等），目的品牌演变成了代言人品牌。

代言人品牌会扩展品牌影响而不是破坏品牌。

Why Strong Purpose Brands Are So Rare为什么强大的目的品牌如此罕见

Given the power that purpose brands have in creating opportunities for differentiation, premium pricing, and growth, isn’t it odd that so few companies have a deliberate strategy for creating them?

鉴于目的品牌在创造差异化、溢价定价和增长机会方面的力量，很少有公司有深思熟虑的战略来创造这些机会，这难道不奇怪吗？

Consider the automobile industry. There are a significant number of different jobs that people who purchase cars need to get done, but only a few companies have staked out any of these job markets with purpose brands. Range Rover (until recently, at least) was a clear and valuable purpose brand (the take-me-anywhere- with-total-dependability job). The Volvo brand is positioned on the safety job. Porsche, BMW, Mercedes, Bentley, and Rolls-Royce are associ- ated with various aspirational jobs. The Toyota endorser brand has earned the connotation of reliability. But for so much of the rest? It’s hard to know what they mean.

以汽车行业为例。购买汽车的人需要完成大量不同的工作，但只有少数公司在这些就业市场中的任何一个都有目的品牌。路虎揽胜（至少直到最近）是一个目标明确且有价值的品牌（带我去任何地方且完全可靠的工作）。沃尔沃品牌定位于安全工作。保时捷、宝马、梅赛德斯、宾利和劳斯莱斯与各种令人向往的工作联系在一起。丰田代言人品牌赢得了可靠性的内涵。但是剩下的大部分呢？很难知道它们是什么意思。

To illustrate: Clayton Christensen recently needed to deliver on a long-promised commitment to buy a car as a college graduation gift for his daughter Annie. There were functional and emotional dimensions to the job. The car needed to be stylish and fun to drive, to be sure. But even more important, as his beloved daughter was venturing off into the cold, cruel world, the big job Clay needed to get done was to know that she was safe and for his sweet Annie to be reminded frequently, as she owned, drove, and serviced the car, that her dad loves and cares for her. A hands-free telephone in the car would be a must, not an option. A version of GM’s OnStar service, which called not just the police but Clay in the event of an accident, would be important. A system that reminded the occasionally absentminded Annie when she needed to have the car serviced would take a load off her dad’s mind. If that service were delivered as a prepaid gift from her father, it would take another load off Clay’s mind because he, too, is occasionally absentminded. Should Clay have hired a Taurus, Escape, Cavalier, Neon, Prizm, Corolla, Camry, Avalon, Sentra, Civic, Accord, Senator, Sonata, or something else? The billions of dollars that automakers spent advertising these brands, seeking somehow to create subtle differentiations in image, helped Clay not at all. Finding the best package to hire was very time-con- suming and inconvenient, and the resulting product did the job about as unsatisfactorily as the milk shake had done, a few years earlier.

举个例子：克莱顿·克里斯滕森（Clayton Christensen）最近需要兑现长期承诺，为女儿安妮（Annie）买一辆车作为大学毕业礼物。这项工作有功能和情感两个方面。当然，这辆车需要时尚且驾驶起来充满乐趣。但更重要的是，当他心爱的女儿冒险进入寒冷、残酷的世界时，克莱需要完成的大工作是知道她是安全的，并让他亲爱的安妮经常被提醒，因为她拥有、驾驶和维修这辆车，她的父亲爱她，关心她。车内的免提电话是必须的，而不是可选的。通用汽车的OnStar服务版本非常重要，该服务在发生事故时不仅可以监督，还可以报警。这系统可以提醒偶尔心不在焉的安妮什么时候需要修理汽车，将减轻她父亲的负担。如果这种服务是作为她父亲预付的礼物提供的，这将减轻克莱的另一个负担，因为他偶尔也会心不在焉。克莱应该租金牛座、Escape、Cavalier、Neon、Prizm、Corolla、Camry、Avalon、Sentra、Civic、Accord、Senator、Sonata还是其他车？汽车制造商花费数十亿美元为这些品牌做广告，试图以某种方式在形象上创造微妙的差异，但对克莱毫无帮助。发现最好的包装是非常耗时和不方便的，最终的产品做的工作和几年前的奶昔一样不令人满意。

Focusing a product and its brand on a job creates differentiation. The rub, however, is that when a company communicates the job a branded product was designed to do perfectly, it is also communicating what jobs the product should not be hired to do. Focus is scary—at least the carmakers seem to think so. They deliberately create words as brands that have no meaning in any language, with no tie to any job, in the myopic hope that each individual model will be hired by every customer for every job. The results of this strategy speak for themselves. In the face of compelling evidence that purpose-branded products that do specific jobs well command premium pricing and compete in markets that are much larger than those defined by product categories, the auto- makers’ products are substantially undifferentiated, the average subbrand commands less than a 1% market share, and most automakers are losing money. Somebody gave these folks the wrong recipe for prosperity.

将产品及其品牌专注于一项工作会创造差异化。然而，问题在于，当一家公司传达品牌产品旨在完美完成的工作时，它也在传达该产品不应该被雇佣去做的工作。福克斯很可怕——至少汽车制造商似乎是这么认为的。他们肆无忌惮地创造出在任何语言中都没有意义、与任何工作都没有联系的品牌词，短视地希望每个模特都会被每个客户雇佣来做每一份工作。这一战略的结果不言自明。面对令人信服的证据表明，能够很好地完成特定工作的专用品牌产品拥有溢价，并且在比产品类别定义的市场大得多的市场中竞争，汽车制造商的产品基本上没有差异化，平均子品牌的市场份额不到1%，大多数汽车制造商都在亏损。有人给了这些人错误的繁荣秘诀。

Executives everywhere are charged with generating profitable growth. Rightly, they believe that brands are the vehicles for meeting their growth and profit targets. But success in brand building remains rare. Why? Not for lack of effort or resources. Nor for lack of opportunity in the marketplace. The root problem is that the theories in practice for market segmentation and brand building are riddled with flawed assumptions. Lafley is right. The model is broken. We’ve tried to illustrate a way out of the death spiral of serial product failure, missed opportunity, and squandered wealth. Marketers who choose to break with the bro- ken past will be rewarded not only with successful brands but with profitably growing businesses as well.

各地的高管都负责创造盈利增长。他们正确地认为，品牌是实现增长和利润目标的工具。但品牌建设的成功仍然很少。为什么？不是因为缺乏努力或资源。也不是因为市场上缺乏机会。根本问题在于，市场细分和品牌建设的理论在实践中充斥着错误的假设。拉弗利是对的。模型坏了。我们试图说明一种摆脱连续产品失败、错失机会和挥霍财富的死亡螺旋的方法。选择与破碎的过去决裂的营销人员不仅会获得成功的品牌，还会获得利润丰厚的业务增长。

 

在不破坏品牌的情况下扩展品牌

总结

本文主要介绍营销弊端病因和治疗，通过列举现实企业的案例分析企业构建目的品牌的目的与过程，说明企业应该理解客户需求，理解工作，设计出符合消费者预期的商品。此外，文章也指出打造企业品牌并非是在广告营销的过程，企业的广告营销一般是在企业建立品牌后实施的策略，是在不破坏品牌情况下扩展品牌。